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In every nation, obstacles to prosperity and economic growth result from activities ofgovernment. My

task is to analyze key aspects ofthis phenomenon and present possible improvements. I will draw on the
American experience, mainly because I have more knowledge about it than of other countries' activities. Of
course, it is up to the decisionmakers ofJapan to decide which, ifany, ofthese policies are appropriate for your
country.
In no nation is there a government agency with a mission to depress the economy or to accelerate
inflation. However, many government actions- especially taxation, government spending, and regulationhave those undesirable effects. I focus on government regulation ofbusiness because regulatory costs are
especially insidious. They are a hidden tax severely reducing the competitiveness of domestic businesses at a
time when they face an increasingly global marketplace.
Moreover, reducing the burden ofregulation can contribute to more rapid economic growth without the
adverse inflationary and currency repercussions that often accompany more stimulating monetary and fiscal
policies. Reform ofregulation responds specifically to policymakers' desires to reduce the structural impediments to economic growth.
The role of regulation should not be considered in isolation, but as a part of an extensive effort to
reduce the burden of government involvement in the economy. This comprehensive approach is essential
because ofthe ease of substituting regulation for other forms of government activity, such as direct Treasury
outlays.
Murray Weidenbaum is chairman ofthe Center for the Study of American Business and Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professor at Washington University in St. Louis. In 1981-82, he served as chairman of
President Reagan's Council ofEconomic Advisers; he was a member of the President's Economic Policy
Advisory Board, 1982-89.
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The Many Costs of Government Regulation
The popular view of regulation is wrong. It is not a contest between "the forces of good" (meaning
government) and ''the forces of evil" (obviously, business). The reality is that the consumer is at the receiving
end of the numerous impacts and repercussions generated by regulation. Business is the middleman (or
woman).
The nature of regulation becomes apparent when we look at it from the viewpoint of the business
enterprise. For each box on its organizational chart, there are government agencies that are counterparts to
that box: environmental regulators and construction ofnew facilities; job safety regulators and the workplace;
employment regulators and human resource policies; transportation and communication regulators and the
movement ofgoods, services, and information. Those agencies- and many others-are heavily involved in
the company's internal decision making.
The impact ofthose government rule makers and controllers is in one direction: increasing the firm's
overhead and operating costs, slowing down its decisionmaking processes, and reducing the resources available to produce goods and services.
Regulation results in the higher prices that consumers pay to cover the cost of compliance. But that
makes regulation attractive to government officials. The costs do not showup in the government's budget. Yet
citizens do not escape paying the bill. Politicians have an old saying, "The best tax is a hidden tax." Regulation
generates the most hidden taxes ofall- the costs are imbedded in prices ofgoods and services that consumers purchase.
In the United States, the cost ofmeeting the rules promulgated by federal regulatory agencies add up

to more than $500 billion a year. Regulation by state and local governments is in addition. IfCongress had to
appropriate another $500 billion a year to cover those expenses, it is unlikely they would approve so much
regulation.
Going beyond the direct financial impact, we find subtle and more serious burdens resulting from the
government's rules and prohibitions. By the time that the Clean Air Act is fully implemented in the year 2005
-seven years from now- its impact in the United States (combined with that of previous environmental
regulations) will reduce real gross domestic product by more than 3 percent a year. That is just one regulatory
program, albeit our largest.
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Regulation also reduces the degree ofcompetition, the flow ofinnovation, and the production ofnew
and better products because so many government regulatory agencies have the power, which they frequently
exercise, to decide whether or not a company can enter an industry or a new product go on the market. The
biggest obstacles to developing a new biotechnology industry are not financial or technological. They are
regulatory.
The rising paperwork requirements of government agencies inevitably produce a lengthening regulatory lag. This delay often runs into years and is a costly drain on the productivity ofprivate managers as well
as public officials. In 1980, a California land developer obtained in 90 days what was then called "zoning" for
a residential development. Currently, the typical company in that state receives an "entitlement to build" for
one ofits developments only after two years or more of intensive work.
Opening new production facilities involves surmounting an even greater array ofregulatory obstacles.
A former administrator ofthe Environmental Protection Agency has described what is required to locate a new
industrial fucility:
A company must obtain agreement from dozens of agencies at each ofthree levels ofgovernment, not to
mention the courts .... A single "no" anywhere along the line at any time in the process can halt years of
planning, effort and investment.
That was the experience ofthe Dow Chemical Company. Repeated regulatory delays forced the firm
to cancel plans for building a $300 million petrochemical complex. When the project was terminated after
extensive preliminary effort, Dow had obtained only 4 ofthe 65 permits it needed from various national, state,
local, and regional regulatory agencies.
Many firms respond by shifting their activities to foreign locations. Some ofthe best-known American
companies have deployed a majority oftheir assets overseas- Manpower Inc., Gillette, Mobil, IBM, Avon,
McDonald's, Sun Microsystems, Exxon, Chevron, Bankers Trust, Warner Lambert, and Citicorp.
This point should not be misunderstood. My criticism is limited to those instances where companies
would stay in their home territory were it not for the disincentives of government regulation. I surely do not
advocate government interfering in the normal flow ofgoods, services, and investment across national boundaries in response to economic forces.
The justifications for the government's awesome regulatory power are worthy: to promote a cleaner
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environment, to achieve a healthier work place, and to keep unsafe products offthe market Sadly, the reality
is often different. Consider the hann that pharmaceutical regulation does to the American people.
When we examine the list ofprescription drugs actually approved as safe and effective, we find that the
United States is one ofthe last countries to permit the introduction ofnew and better pharmaceutical products.
That means that Americans frequently are deprived of superior medicines for many years while the products
are available to patients in other industrialized nations.
The adverse effects of government regulation are far more numerous than most people realize. These
burdens include:
(1) the cost to taxpayers for supporting a galaxy of government regulators,
(2) the cost to consumers in the form ofhigher prices to cover the added expense ofproducing goods
and services under government regulation,
(3) the cost to workers in the form ofjobs eliminated by regulation,
(4) the cost to the economy resulting from the loss of enterprises which cannot afford to meet the
onerous burdens ofgovernment regulations, and
(5) the cost to society, as a whole, as a result of a reduced flow ofnew and better products and a less
rapid rise in the standard ofliving.
The benefits of regulation should not be overlooked. Indeed, in the reform approach that I will propose, the benefits and the costs of regulation are directly compared. To the extent that the society obtains
cleaner air, purer water, safer products, and healthier workplaces, these benefits are real. However, the mere
presence of a government agency does not guarantee that its worthy objectives will be achieved.
For example, a steel company was required to install special scrubbing equipment at one of its plants
in order to reduce the emission ofvisible iron oxide dust. The scrubber succeeds in capturing 21.2 pounds an
hour ofthe pollutant. However, the scrubber is run by a large electric motor. In producing the power for that
motor, the electric utility spews out 23.0 pounds an hour of sulfur and nitrogen oxides and other gaseous
pollutants. Thus, even though the company is meeting government regulations on visible emissions, the air is
actually 1.8 pounds an hour dirtier because ofthe regulatory requirement.
The serious question is not whether regulations produce any benefits but whether they are worth the
costs. That, in turn, leads us to consider opportunities for improvement.
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The Benefits of Economic Deregulation
How can we reduce the burdens ofregulation? We can start by questioning the traditional justification,
which is the notion ofmarketfailure. For a variety ofreasons- ranging from the inadequacy ofinformation
to the presence of major externalities- private markets are deemed not to work well enough (a typical
externality occurs when a producer upstream discharges pollutants into a river harming the people who live
downstream). However, economists have also developed the companion notion ofgovernmentfailure, the
tendency for the public sector to do more harm than good when it intervenes in economic activity.
As a result, economists urge policymakers to rely primarily on competition in the marketplace to
protect the consumer. In the last two decades, deregulation oftransportation has made great progress in the
United States. A little later, however, I will deal with situations where relying on competition may not suffice.
Until the late 1970s, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) regulated the airline industry. It allocated
routes, controlling both entry into these markets and the fares to be charged. In 1977, the CAB, led by two
economists, began the process that resulted in airline deregulation. Initially, the CAB gave the companies
increased freedom in pricing and easier access to routes not previously served. The results were spectacular.
{\,

Fares fell sharply, planes filled, and profits soared.
A year later, Congress passed legislation that phased out the CAB, ending its authority to control entry
and prices. Since then, air traffic has grown faster and airfares have fallen more rapidly than they did during
regulation. The industry's employment has risen and labor productivity has increased.
The experience since 1978 has not been without problems, notably congestion in airports and in the
sky. On balance, the public interest has been well served by airline deregulation. The savings to air travelers
have been estimated at over $12 billion a year (in 1993 dollars).
Encouraged by the airline experience, in 1980 Congress passed a trucking law which provided more
pricing freedom to individual carriers, made entry into the market easier, and eliminated many costly restrictions on the part ofthe Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).
Although 300 trucking companies went out ofbusiness, the total number oftrucking firms increased
very substantially, from 47,000 in 1982 to 300,000 in 1997. On average, operating costs per mile are down
about one-third. Estimates ofannual savings from trucking deregulation- including lower inventory needsrange up to $50 billion a year.
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Also in 1980, Congress gave the railroads new flexibility in setting rates and, in 1996, it terminated the
ICC. The experience with railroad deregulation has been similar to trucking. A difficult adjustment occurred
at the outset as the impact ofcompetition became more pervasive. Over 27,000 miles ofunprofitable rail lines
were abandoned during a period ofliquidations. However, the remaining firms in the industry are now in strong
financial condition.
Spurred by deregulation, managerial innovations have contributed to a reduction ofabout one half in
real railroad costs per ton mile offreight hauled. The cost cutting has enabled the railroads to pay for upgrading
equipment and deferred maintenance as well as to lower rates and compete more effectively against other
modes oftransportation.
Less complete patterns of deregulation have occurred in telecommunications and banking. Greater
freedom to innovate and to reduce costs has generally produced positive results. But the continued presence
of substantial regulation has prevented the full benefits ofmarket competition from occurring.
The reluctance of government decisionmakers to support the wholesale substitution of competition for
regulation is a serious obstacle, especially in the effort to achieve telecommunications deregulation. Eliminating
the regulatory apparatus (as in the CAB and ICC examples) works far better than more timid attempts accompanied by government efforts to regulate closely the process of deregulation.

Reform of Social Regulation
Simultaneous with the reduction of economic regulation, social regulation has been on the rise. Numerous new regulatory agencies are now active in the areas of ecology and safety. Their ftmction is not to control
entry, exit, prices, or profits in the tradition of the older regulation, but to handle such market failures as
information inadequacies and externalities.
Rather than dealing with the overall condition ofthe industries they are regulating (as was the case ofthe
CAB and ICC), these newer regulatory agencies are concerned with achieving social benefits (safer products,
healthier workplaces, etc.). Thus, the Environmental Protection Agency focuses on the impacts of all businesses on the environment.
Unlike economic regulatory commissions which, at times, were too close to the companies they regulate,
EPA and its sister social regulatory agencies ignore their adverse impact on the industries they regulate. This
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raises the serious question of limiting the activities ofthe new breed ofregulators.
Surely, the public does not endorse the bureaucratic approach: regulation is good, so more is always
better than less. Economists look at the margin and think ofdiminishing returns. We ask the difficult questions
that have generated the basis for reforming social regulation, especially the importance ofgovernment failure.
To an economist, the response to environmental pollution is not the negative task ofpunishing wrongdoers. That only occurs after the foul deed has been done. Rather, the challenge is positive: to change incentives
so that people will not pollute in the first place. After all, people do not enjoy a dirty environment. They pollute
when it is cheaper or easier than not polluting. Fundamentally, an appropriate regime ofproperty rights should
deal with this issue.
Until then, policymakers should make the maximum use ofeconomic incentives. One basic approach
is that the price of a product should reflect its burden on the environment. Ifprices of goods and services were
increased to reflect those costs (perhaps as measured by cleanup outlays), consumers would buy less ofthose
environmentally damaging products. The idea is to use the price system to make high-polluting products less
attractive to consumers than low-polluting products.
A study ofone estuary in the State ofDelaware showed that eflluent fees, set at a high enough level to
achieve the desired level ofwater purity, would achieve the same environmental cleanup at only one-halfthe
cost ofconventional regulation.
In the U.S. regulatory process, the major use ofeconomic incentives is the system oftrading emissions

permits under the Clean Air Act. This enables a company that can clean up its pollution very cheaply to sell
some of its credits to a company whose compliance costs are much higher. The cost to society for achieving
the desired level ofair quality is lower than under the traditional approach.
What about the existing array ofcommand-and-control regulation? Here, every president since Gerald
Ford has required the regulatory agencies to do benefit/cost analysis in an effort to determine if a regulation
does more good than hann.
Benefit/cost analysis has been used for decades in examining government spending programs. It is a
simple way ofbalancing market failure (as measured by potential benefits of government action) against government failure (costs of government action). To an economist, "overregulation" is not an emotional term. It is
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merely shorthand for rules for which the costs to the public are greater than the benefits.
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Benefit/cost tests compensate for the fact that government decision makers do not face economic
constraints. Ifthe costs to society of an agency action exceed the benefits, that situation does not have an
adverse impact on the agency. The administrators may not even know about it.
Under the traditional approach they can claim credit for the benefits and ignore the costs- because,
as noted, the costs are transmitted to the consumer not by the government but by business. Regulatory
activists can enjoy criticizing business about price increases, even when they result from the costs ofcomplying
with the very regulations that the activists urged be adopted.
During the presidency ofRonald Reagan, federal agencies were directed to limit their new regulations
to those that generate more benefits than costs. Many pending regulations failed to meet this requirement. In
the case ofthe Department of Labor, approximately 40 percent of the proposed new rules had to be withdrawn or revised. The Clinton Administration has lowered the threshold for approval of new regulations.
Currently, the agencies merely have to show a "reasonable relationship" between costs and benefits. This is a
much more subjective and easier standard to meet.

Conclusion
To conclude, I offer four basic principles for guidance:
(1) Government intervention is only warranted when markets do not work as well as regulation.

The presence of"market failure" is a necessary but not sufficient condition for government to
intervene.
(2) The legislature and the regulatory agencies should estimate costs and benefits before they
enact new laws or issue new regulations.
(3) Whenever feasible, the power ofmarket incentives should be enlisted in pursuit ofsociety's
goals instead ofcommand-and-control directives. The pressure of competition and the lure of

profits should be recognized as forces vital to achieving a healthy and growing economy.
(4) Delegations ofauthority by legislatures should contain specific controls to ensure that regulatory authority is not exercised capriciously. The influence ofbusiness may be substantial, but
the power of government can be overwhelming. The largest company cannot tax people or put
them injail; the smallest unit ofgovernment can.

A final thought. Government decision makers often overlook a fundamental fact in their rush to intervene in the private sector: individuals and private organizations have tremendous ability to deal on their own
with the shortcomings ofa modem economy. Relying on private initiative moves us yloserto the ideal of a free
society while simultaneously providing a powerful incentive to improved economic performance.
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